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1. Introduction
It is admittedly a commonplace, but probably a useful one, to begin a philosophical 
discourse by dividing the problems into three main areas of inquiry: 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics. This division is usually attributed to the 
Greeks, but it is no easy task to trace it to its origins. Applying it to the dialogues 
of Plato might or might not shed some light on some of the dialogues and their 
arguments, but in many ways it seems an unnecessary distraction, especially 
since Plato seems bent, generally, on synthesizing the philosophical enterprise 
into a coherent unity. Aristotle, the perpetual analyst, in the course of 
discussing some problems related to dialectic, makes an important contribution 
to this general problem, in order to render more manageable the specific problem 
under discussion: Ἔστι δ´ ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν 
προβλημάτων μέρη τρία· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δὲ 
φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ λογικαί. Ἠθικαὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται, οἷον πότερον 
δεῖ τοῖς γονεῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν, ἐὰν 
διαφωνῶσιν· λογικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ 
ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ· φυσικαὶ δὲ οἷον πότερον (105b25) ὁ κόσμος ἀίδιος 
ἢ οὔ. 
It is possible to distinguish by type three kinds of questions and 
problems: some are ethical questions, some are physical, some are 
logical. Ethical questions are such as this, whether one ought to listen 
to one’s parents or to the law, if they are at odds; logical questions are 
such as this, whether the knowledge of opposite things is the same, or 
not; physical questions are such as this, whether the universe is 
unending, or not (Topics 105b19-25, translation mine). 
Later, in Stoic philosophy, Aristotle’s “logical” questions are broadened in scope and 
renamed “epistemology,” and the “physical” questions, analogously, become 
“ontology.” This tripartite division of genres in philosophical inquiry was 
bequeathed, as it were, to philosophical posterity, where, as mentioned at the 
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beginning, it has become a commonplace. Ontology, then, consists in a philosophical 
inquiry into being, while epistemology examines the nature of knowledge and the 
mind, and the goal of ethics is to explore behavior, or more specifically, how 
philosophy could or should guide moral choices. The goal of ontology is to 
understand being and non-being; of epistemology, to understand what is true and 
what is false; and of ethics, to distinguish right from wrong.  
The operative ethical concept called “right” in English is encompassed 
(though the lexical mapping is hardly exact) by the Greek δικαιοσύνη, a concept 
usually translated “justice” in philosophical texts, but “righteousness” in the New 
Testament. Herein, of course, lies the problem: where Greek authors can attribute 
δικαιοσύνη to either individuals or societies without any sense of awkwardness or 
ambiguity, it seems distinctly odd, in English, to associate “righteousness” with the 
character of a society (a state, a community, a city), while “justice” is, if not 
inappropriate, then at least slightly odd, when applied an individual – unless, of 
course, the individual in question is a person of authority (a monarch, an official, a 
judge) making decisions on behalf of and in the name of the state. It may be 
tempting, when considering the meaning of δικαιοσύνη in pre-Christian Greek 
philosophy, to ignore “righteousness” and concentrate on “justice,” but that is at 
best a convenient bracketing, not a solution. 
We should acknowledge that, in reality, neither of those two English words, 
“justice” or “righteousness,” is fully satisfactory to translate δικαιοσύνη: both are at 
best partial renderings of what the Greek word means.  
The problem is familiar to students of Plato. The first definition of 
δικαιοσύνη proposed by Polemarchus in Book I of Plato’s Republic is “doing good to 
one’s friends and harm to one’s enemies,” a conventional formulation that runs 
through much of archaic Greek poetry. When Socrates shakes his confidence in a 
definition that most Greek readers would have regarded as obvious, even self-
evident, Polemarchus falls back on a second definition: giving back what is owed. 
Neither of these two definitions, to English ears, sound like definitions of “justice” at 
all, since these are matters of ethics – that is, determining what is right – rather 
than political philosophy. Thrasymachus’s definition, on the other hand (justice is 
whatever is consistent with the interests of the stronger) seems more public and 
political, which makes it, though arguably morally abhorrent, at least 
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comprehensible as a definition of “justice.” If Polemarchus was attempting to find a 
principle or axiom that would explain what is right, Thrasymachus is at least trying 
to say what is just – assuming, of course, that δικαιοσύνη in fact means simply 
“justice,” which is precisely the point at issue here. The assumption can hardly be 
forced. The transition from Polemarchus to Thrasymachus as Socrates’ interlocutors 
raises the problem of what δικαιοσύνη really means, without solving it. 
In Book II, then, Socrates proposes to search for the essence of this 
particular virtue in the soul, by expanding the scale of inquiry to the level of the city. 
This maneuver can seem almost indefensible to a critically-minded English speaker, 
but it makes much more sense if we accept that the Greek word which Socrates and 
his friends are out to define is a single concept that can be manifested in both public 
and private life. In other words, δικαιοσύνη is both justice and righteousness, 
public and private “rightness,” rolled into one. 
The purpose of this article is to examine, from an ethical perspective, an 
apparently trivial topos of the ancient Greek novel: the “trial scene,” in which one of 
the protagonists is accused of a crime and put on trial, but ultimately prevails 
against a determined prosecution. Specifically, I will present here three such 
episodes, which diverge from the model just described, in ways that serve to shed 
some particular light on the meaning of δικαιοσύνη itself, in both its public (civic) 
and private (personal) senses. Before this will make much sense, however, we shall 
need to go, as Socrates puts it, “by the longer road.” 
In a famous passage from the Poetics (1452b – 1453a), Aristotle considers 
the types of plots that should be considered properly “tragic.” He rejects as untragic 
any plot which brings a good man (ὰνὴρ ἐπιεικής) from good fortune (εὐτυχία) to 
bad (δυστυχία), or conversely, one that brings a bad man (ὰνὴρ μοχθηρός) from 
bad fortune (here, ἀτυχία rather than δυστυχία) to good (εὐτυχία); he also rejects 
a third alternative scheme, when a genuinely bad man (σφόδρα πονηρός) incurs 
fully deserved punishment, since such a plot might be edifying (φιλάνθρωπος), 
but inspires neither pity nor fear, and is thus not tragic. This line of reasoning leads 
him to the famous definition of the tragic hero, which he presents as a middle point 
(ὁ μεταξὺ τούτων): that is, a man not preeminently virtuous or just, who is 
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brought from good fortune to bad, not by innate wickedness, but because of some 
flaw or mistake (δι´ ἁμαρτίαν τινά).  
After some development of this argument (with particular attention to 
Euripides), Aristotle then takes up what he calls the “double structure,” which is to 
say, a plot that simultaneously brings the virtuous to good fortune and the wicked to 
bad fortune. This paragraph (often overshadowed completely by the “tragic flaw” 
discussion that immediately precedes it) requires closer attention here: 
 
δευτέρα δ᾽ ἡ πρώτη λεγομένη ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐστιν σύστασις, ἡ 
διπλῆν τε τὴν σύστασιν ἔχουσα καθάπερ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια καὶ 
τελευτῶσα ἐξ ἐναντίας τοῖς βελτίοσι καὶ χείροσιν. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι 
πρώτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτρων ἀσθένειαν: ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ 
ποιηταὶ κατ᾽ [35] εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς. ἔστιν δὲ οὐχ 
αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεία: 
ἐκεῖ γὰρ οἳ ἂν ἔχθιστοι ὦσιν ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, οἷον Ὀρέστης καὶ 
Αἴγισθος, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἐξέρχονται, καὶ 
ἀποθνῄσκει οὐδεὶς ὑπ᾽ οὐδενός.  
Second [viz. in order of preference] is the structure that some call first, 
the one which has a double structure, like the Odyssey, and ends in the 
opposite way for the better and worse characters. It seems to be first 
because of the weakness of the theaters: for the poets give the 
audience that which they demand. This is not the same pleasure as 
from a tragedy, but rather something similar to comedy: for there, 
those who are bitter enemies in the myth, such as Orestes and 
Aegisthus, come out as friends at the end, and no one is killed by 
anyone (Poetics 1453a, translation mine). 
The kind of plot Aristotle seems to hold almost in contempt here, as though it were 
simply pandering to ἀσθένεια, is something I shall call here, for convenience’s 
sake, “naïve justice.” Good things happen to good people, and bad things to bad 
people, and all is well in the world (though this is always so much easier to do in 
fiction than in reality). For the present purposes, then, I propose to examine this 
problem, not from the perspective of standard philosophical discourse, but rather 
from a perhaps unexpected source: the ancient Greek novels, the popular literature 
of late antiquity. Philosophers, traditionally, do not listen much to the vox populi, but 
there are times, pace Socrates or Aristotle, when there may well be something to be 
learned from the “weakness” of the masses. 
Naïve Justice in the Ancient Greek Novel
 
 
18 
 
The ancient Greek novels – five of which are extant – are a product of the last 
centuries of pagan Greek literature, from the first to the fifth century CE, and until 
rather recently have not been the object of much serious study. Nietzsche regarded 
them with contempt, since in his view they were the opposite of the tragedy he so 
much admired: rather than embracing the inevitability of death, they pandered to 
the readers’ desire to imagine that death could be evaded. Nietzsche’s sometime 
friend, the classical scholar Erwin Rhode, wrote a book, perhaps in explicit or 
implicit answer to Nietzsche’s critique, on the ancient Greek novel (Rhode, 1876), 
but he made no case that these works displayed any particular literary or (even less) 
philosophical merit. Almost a century later, Ben Edwin Perry (1967), though he 
rejected Rohde’s theory in detail, called the putative readers of these unassuming 
works the “poor-in-spirit,” perhaps unconsciously echoing Aristotle’s remark about 
the ἀσθένεια of the theater-going public. Perry’s belittling characterization of the 
readership of the ancient novel has since been attacked (see, inter alios, Anderson, 
1982; MacQueen, 1991), but it is hard to avoid the impression that most, if not all 
of these five texts are addressed to a much broader and presumably far less 
sophisticated audience than the philosophical texts of classical and Hellenistic Greek 
literature. 
At first glance, these texts may indeed seem to have been the Harlequin 
romances of their day, and as such not to merit any sort of close reading. The form 
of composition seems thoroughly generic – that is, the individuality of each of these 
novels mostly comes from the way a given author orders, manipulates, and 
combines plot devices and characters that are already familiar from other works 
belonging to the same genre. The twists and turns of the particular plot, though 
elaborate, seldom deviate far from the basic plotline: a handsome young man and a 
beautiful young woman meet, fall in love, but must pass through numerous 
adventures and ordeals before the story ends on a note that can hardly be otherwise 
described than by saying, “and they lived happily ever after.” These adventures and 
ordeals are the main topoi from which the story is built, and, as most scholars now 
agree, show too many points of contact with the New Comedy of Menander for this 
to be entirely coincidental (Anderson, 1982).  
It would be digressive here to pursue this characterization of the genre 
much further, especially because much recent scholarship on the individual novels 
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(including my own modest contributions) has tended to suggest that at least some of 
these authors may deserve more respect than they have heretofore been afforded. 
Rather, I propose to single out one topos of perhaps obvious interest to ethicists: the 
trial scene. With some variation, this plot device is not unfamiliar even to modern 
audiences, in one form or another. The hero or heroine is falsely accused of a crime 
(typically, they have been framed by a wicked character, often a rejected lover) and 
put on trial (mostly public, but sometimes before a king or other high public 
official); but then, just when the preponderance of hostile testimony seems to doom 
the hapless defendant to certain conviction and execution, the tables are turned, and 
the hero or heroine is exonerated. Typically, the wicked prosecutor then suffers the 
very fate intended for our hero or heroine.  
As plot devices, these scenes can be compared to another common topos, 
usually called Scheintod, which involves one of the two romantic partners being 
given reason to suppose that the other partner has died. When the grieving reaches 
its greatest intensity and has become all but unbearable, it is revealed that the 
partner is in fact not dead, so that grief gives way, suddenly, to joy. In both topoi, 
then, pity and fear (recalling Aristotle’s formulation of ἔλεος and φόβος in tragedy) 
are deliberately aroused in the reader, only to be assuaged in short order by the 
happy outcome. The apparent intention of these authors to achieve just this effect 
is exactly what prompted Nietzsche’s disdain for the entire genre. Modern popular 
literature (including, of course, film and television fiction) are similarly inclined to 
construct plots built around suspense and reversal, in order to arouse as much 
emotion as possible, without leaving the reader (viewer) for very long in the grips of 
pity and fear. 
There are three trial scenes in these novels, however, that upon closer 
inspection can actually be said to subvert the “asthenic” model just described. These 
are the following: 
(1) the trial of Chaereas in Chariton’s Chaereas and Callirhoe, which 
occurs at the end of Book I;  
(2) the trial by ordeal of Leucippe in Achilles Tatius’s Leucippe and 
Clitophon, which occurs in Book VIII, and constitutes virtually the 
last major incident of the novel; 
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(3) the impromptu trial of Daphnis in Longus’s Daphnis and Chloe, 
which occurs in Book II and serves to trigger a number of incidents 
central to the novel.  
2. The Trial of Chaereas 
 
The two young lovers of Chariton’s novel meet, fall in love, and marry before the 
first book of the novel is over, and in due course Callirhoe is pregnant. The 
misadventures begin when a group of disgruntled former suitors manage to 
convince Chaereas that the child is not his. In a rage, he kicks Callirhoe in the 
stomach, which causes her to fall senseless to the floor, to all appearances dead. 
After a funeral described in great detail, Callirhoe, still as beautiful as though she 
were alive (of course, she is really only in a coma) is laid to rest in a tomb that has 
been carved into cliffs overlooking the sea. When a notorious grave robber named 
Theron breaks into the tomb to plunder it, he and his accomplices are astounded to 
find there a beautiful and very much alive and alert young woman, who has 
awakened from her coma; seeing a great profit to be made on the slave market, they 
take her away.  
In the meantime, Chaereas’s father (whom the novelist has identified at the 
very beginning of the novel as none other than Hermocrates, a very real historical 
person, the Syracusan general who brought about the destruction of the Athenian 
expedition in the single most crucial battle of the Peloponnesian War) brings 
charges against his son-in-law for the unlawful killing of his daughter. Chaereas, 
however, is so consumed by remorse and grief that not only does he refuse to 
defend himself, but he actually becomes his own prosecutor. Hermocrates, for his 
part, moved by the depth of the young man’s grief, changes his mind and tries to 
persuade the court to show leniency. In the end, Hermocrates wins and Chaereas is 
spared execution for murder. The young widower, however, is inconsolable, and uses 
his freedom only to go down to Callirhoe’s tomb, intending to kill himself over her 
dead body. When he arrives, he discovers that there is no body, and from the 
physical clues deduces that she has been taken by pirates. He sets off to find her, and 
the adventures begin. 
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The irony of this particular trial scene (which occurs early in the first book 
of the oldest extant Greek novel) lies of course in the fact that the victim of the 
murder is not in fact dead, and that the prosecutor becomes the defender, while the 
defendant becomes the prosecutor – of himself. Moreover, even allowing for the 
notorious Greek tolerance for domestic violence, it is hard to excuse what Chaereas 
has done. In fact, his self-prosecution is absolutely correct as far as the law is 
concerned. He has done that which he is accused of doing: without sufficient reason 
or justification, he has committed an act of physical violence that has (apparently) 
caused an innocent person to die. Some readers may be swayed by the arguments of 
Hermocrates, who bases his arguments on the absence of malice, apparently 
assuming that, if Chaereas’ suspicions regarding Callirhoe’s pregnancy had been 
correct, his attack on her person would have been justified. But it takes more than 
that to really excuse what Chaereas has done. 
This is hardly (at least at this point), the “double structure” held in such 
contempt by Aristotle. The roles of the “better” and “worse” parties in the trial are 
hopelessly confused: however much an audience may feel sympathy for Chaereas, 
the facts are against him, and so is the law, which in any reasonable moral 
calculation makes him the “worse” party. Hermocrates, the prosecutor, seems to be 
rather the opposite of the malicious slanderer who is stereotypical for trial scenes: 
the case he has brought against Chaereas is fully justified, and his decision to argue 
for mercy is the precise opposite of the “frame up” strategy used by prosecutors. As 
for the change in fortunes: Chaereas is acquitted but is consumed by guilt, and 
intends to inflict upon himself the same punishment, death, which the court refused 
to order. Hermocrates, a loving father who has lost his beloved daughter, denies 
himself the satisfaction of seeing her killer brought to justice by “switching roles” 
and saving his life.  
The fact that Callirhoe is not actually dead, and will ultimately be rescued 
and brought home by the self-accused killer (to the great joy of the entire populace, 
and especially Hermocrates), does not actually change the ethical and 
jurisprudential quandaries of the trial and its verdict. The sufferings that Chaereas 
endures in searching for his wife, which extend even to crucifixion (from which he 
is miraculously saved), may in a sense even the score here between husband and 
wife, but one wonders what a woman in the fictional Callirhoe’s place would 
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actually have thought and felt when she returned, finally, to her home - where her 
husband had kicked her, pregnant, in the belly, the last time they were together 
there. What could the husband say, in that case, that would actually change 
anything? The ancient Greeks, of course, may have had a very different moral 
compass when judging the relations between men and women, but the ancient 
Greek novels are themselves filled with indications that attitudes were changing, 
even if contemporary ideals of gender equality could hardly have been so much as 
glimpsed in the first century of our era.  
Whatever this is, it is not “naïve justice.” 
3. The Trial of Leucippe 
    
What I have here called “the trial of Leucippe” is in fact part of a much larger and 
more elaborate trial scene that occupies most of Book VIII in Leucippe and 
Clitophon. A merchant named Thersander, who has gained possession of Leucippe 
and is holding her as his slave, has hidden her from public view, and then accused 
her lover, Clitophon, of murdering her. Clitophon, believing her dead, is so distraught 
that he fails to defend himself, intending to die, even though he knows himself to be 
innocent of her death. As in the previous case, here, too, Leucippe is not dead at all: 
just when Clitophon has been found guilty and condemned to death (to his own 
perverse satisfaction), she is produced in court, alive, to demonstrate Clitophon’s 
innocence. Rather than concede, however, Thersander insists that Leucippe is a 
harlot slave, not a freeborn woman, and that Clitophon has been lawfully 
condemned to death and must be executed. After some tortuous legal wrangling, the 
decision is made to test Leucippe’s virginity, which according to local tradition is 
done by sealing her up in a grotto sacred to Artemis, where a set of divine Pan pipes 
are hanging. If she is indeed a virgin, the pipes will spontaneously sound a high, 
clear note, but if not, there will be a groaning sound. In the latter case, the woman 
under examination will be sealed up in the grotto and left to die. At the same time, 
Clitophon’s would-be lover and Thersander’s wife, Melitte, is challenged for her 
fidelity to her husband, and this comes to be an essential part of Thersander’s case 
against Clitophon. The ordeal used to settle this issue, also a local tradition, involves 
the woman writing her oath upon a tablet and stepping into a certain sacred pool, 
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where the water is up to her knees; if she is telling the truth, the water stays where 
it is, but if she is lying, then the water rises and boils around her head. 
Leucippe is placed in the grotto, and a high note is heard, so she is released 
to general rejoicing, while Thersander is reviled by the crowd of bystanders. Then 
Melitte, likewise, passes her ordeal. Thersander, fearing the wrath of the people, 
flees into self-imposed exile, while Leucippe and Clitophon are reunited and journey 
on. 
The central irony of all this involves the question of whether either of these 
women is actually innocent of the charges brought against them. In fact, Leucippe 
and Clitophon have tried several times already to consummate their love, but on 
each instance they have been foiled; in fact, all their adventures had begun, in Book 
I, when they were discovered together, in Leucippe’s bedroom, in a compromising 
position, by her mother, and fled through the window to escape her wrath. 
Leucippe, over the course of the preceding seven books, has been in the hands of 
pirates and other men of less than admirable moral character; and while the text is 
very coy about revealing whether or not her virginity is actually intact, Clitophon 
cannot be sure – and neither are we – how Leucippe’s ordeal will end. He is filled 
with anxiety when she enters the grotto, an anxiety he would scarcely have felt if he 
had been confident of her virginity. 
The case of Melitte is even more striking, since she has indeed had sexual 
relations with Clitophon, as we know from Book VI, so that her oath of marital 
fidelity is quite false – though Clitophon never tells Leucippe the truth about all this. 
If the ordeal had gone as it was supposed to go, the water should have risen and 
boiled around Melitte, which would have revealed to everyone, including Leucippe, 
the fact that Clitophon had indeed slept with another man’s wife, violating the rights 
of both Thersander and Leucippe.  
Although a full treatment of all the ironies at work here in this novel would 
be unnecessarily digressive, for the present purposes it may be of use, in analyzing 
the subversion of “naïve justice” at play here, to mention two salient aspects of the 
story. To begin with, the novel is essentially a first-person narration by Clitophon 
himself, who, as Morales has pointed out (Morales 2001), is himself hardly a reliable 
narrator. The novel begins with a fairly brief introduction, in which an unnamed 
first-person narrator describes his chance encounter, in a temple in Sidon, with a 
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young man who turns out to be Clitophon. The balance of the story is told by 
Clitophon, then, and in fact we never return to the temple in Sidon – which means, 
as the story draws to an end in Book IX, that we never learn why Clitophon is in 
Sidon, why he is apparently alone, and why he is so unhappy and so cynical about 
Eros at the moment when he first meets the narrator. Although it has seemed to 
many readers over the years that the work ends this way because it was never 
finished, more recent scholarship, summarized by Morales (2001), has inclined to 
the view that the structure, along with the inconsistencies and obvious omissions, is 
quite deliberate.  
Secondly, the “back story” of Clitophon and Melitte raises many questions, 
even assuming that Clitophon is telling us the truth about what happened. In Book 
IV, Leucippe passes through what is in fact her second Scheintod scene, when 
Clitophon actually witnesses her being beheaded by pirates, who have kidnapped 
her. In fact, it was Leucippe’s servant, dressed in her mistress’s clothes, that the 
pirates beheaded, but Clitophon believes that the headless body he fishes out of the 
Nile is indeed his beloved Leucippe. Inconsolable, he wanders along the banks of the 
Nile for some time, slowly starving in his grief; but he comes to the attention of 
Melitte, the young wife of a prominent merchant, Thersander, who has been gone 
on a perilous journey related to his business for several years now, and is assumed 
to be dead. Melittle falls for Clitophon and determines to have him; after resisting 
her for quite some time, he finally agrees to marry her. Even after they are married, 
however, he remains faithful to his lost love and finds excuse after excuse not to 
consummate the marriage. Finally, Melitte accepts into her household a new slave 
woman, who is none other than Leucippe; Clitophon thinks he recognizes her, but 
refuses to believe that this slave is Leucippe until she writes him a note. Clitophon 
is overjoyed – but before he has decided what to do to gain Leucippe’s freedom, he 
buys time by giving way to Melitte’s pleading, and has sexual relations with her – 
that is, he holds out until after he has learned that Leucippe is alive and near at 
hand. This explains why Clitophon knows, in Book VIII, that Melitte’s oath of 
innocence is false, while Thersander’s accusation of adultery against Melitte and 
Clitophon (he returns unexpectedly, of course, very much alive and very angry) is 
quite true. His guilty secret is shared, in some detail, with the first narrator, in Sidon, 
and thus with us as readers, but not with Leucippe. Perhaps we could speculate that 
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the reason Clitophon is so forlorn at the very beginning of the novel may be 
precisely that Leucippe has discovered the truth and left Clitophon to return to her 
parents; but this is the part of the story, again, that Clitophon does not tell. 
Although in many ways Thersander fills the criteria for the malicious 
prosecutor, in that he has framed Clitophon for a murder he did not commit, the 
situation as a whole is almost comically complicated, with the result that the ethical 
issues at play here are not easy to sort out.  Thersander has indeed made a false 
accusation of murder – but he is also, in reality, a wronged man, and his accusations 
of adultery, despite the apparent verdict of the local oracles, are at least partially 
true. The framed defendant, Clitophon, is a liar and an adulterer. By the end of the 
novel, Thersander has gone from εὐτυχία to δυστυχία, but the moral waters here 
are so muddy that it is hard to defend the proposition that his self-imposed exiled is 
fully deserved. He seems, in Aristotle’s phrase, to be σφόδρα πονηρός, and yet it is 
really his rage against Clitophon and Melitte, far more than his lust for Leucippe, 
that motivates him to frame Clitophon for murder – and that rage, even if not fully 
justified and not sufficient to warrant his behavior, is nonetheless not unmotivated. 
Clitophon, reunited with Leucippe, sails off to a happy life with her, which seems 
like perfect εὐτυχία – unless the reader recalls that he was obviously not a happy 
man when he began to tell the story. A case could perhaps be made – though this 
would take us too far afield for the present study – that by the time we connect the 
incomplete ending of his story with the beginning, and make some not 
unreasonable inferences, Clitophon becomes a sort of tragic hero, falling from good 
fortune to bad because of some mistake or flaw. But there is more than a little irony 
in this. 
4. The Trial of Daphnis 
 
In book II of Longus’ Daphnis and Chloe (chapters 12-17), the young shepherd, 
Daphnis, is seized by a group of angry young men from Methymna, one of the two 
principal cities of the island of Lesbos (the other is Mytilene, in whose district the 
fields lie, where Daphnis and Chloe live and tend their sheep). The Methymnean 
youth are furious, because they have come on a hunting expedition by boat to the 
part of the island where Daphnis tends his sheep, and tied up their boat to a tree, 
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using a rope of plaited vines. Daphnis’s goats have nibbled the vines, breaking the 
rope, and the boat (which had, among other things, a bag full of money on board) 
drifted out to sea and was lost. The Methymnean hunters have decided to take 
Daphnis home with them as their slave, in compensation for their loss, but they are 
prevented by a crowd of locals, who insist on holding a makeshift trial (the verb 
used, interestingly is δικαιολογέω, ΙΙ.14.4, in the aorist middle infinitive, 
δικαιολογήσασθαι) to determine who is at fault and what is to be done. The 
Methymneans argue that Daphnis was negligent in tending his goats, and that, since 
he is a slave (which indeed he is), they are entitled to his person in compensation 
for their loss, which is his fault. Daphnis, defending himself, reminds the “court” that 
they all know him and his goats, and ends his speech by bursting into tears.  
Without further ado, the locals free Daphnis and chase the young men away – which 
will lead, in Book III, to a punitive expedition from Methymna and a counterattack 
by Mytilene. 
At first glance, this all seems somehow familiar and even comforting: a 
confrontation between spoiled, rich youth from the big city and hard-working, 
simple country folk ends with the tables turned on the rich. The problem lies in the 
fact that Daphnis is indeed guilty of neglect (he has been dallying with Chloe and not 
paying enough attention to his goats), and the Greek laws and customs applying to 
losses caused by the negligence of someone else’s slave would have been rather 
clear. In his speech of defense, Daphnis simply appeals to the emotions of the 
“court,” who are all his neighbors and friends, and ends in tears. Since he is the 
charming protagonist of a charming love story, Daphnis elicits sympathy, not only in 
this scene and not only from his neighbors, but throughout the novel and from 
most readers. This is not the only place, however, where there is an undertone of 
something else, a contrary judgement of his character (MacQueen, 1991, 2009) with 
a darker side.  
In the definition of “naïve justice” used to this point, we have heretofore 
skirted an elementary question: what criteria should be used to determine who are 
the “better,” and who the “worse” characters? The most primitive criterion here 
would be self-interest: anyone who does good to me is good, and anyone who harms 
me in any way is bad, where it seems obvious, if circular, to assume that whatever I 
like is right, and whatever I dislike is wrong. From here, it may seem an advance of 
Bruce D. MacQueen
 
27 
 
sorts to something we might call “tribal justice,” which uses the same formula for 
distinguishing right from wrong and good people from bad people, while replacing 
the first person singular with the first person plural: anyone who helps us is good, 
anyone who harms us is bad. In international politics, this kind of tribal justice 
clearly prevails to this day, even if there is some sense, in some people, at some 
times, in some ways, that perhaps there are or ought to be other criteria for right 
and wrong, good and bad. 
The outcome of the “trial” of Daphnis, where the locals set themselves up as 
a kind of court to determine what is right (δικαιολογήσασθαι), can hardly be seen 
in any other way than as an example of tribal justice. The moral ambiguity of the 
whole situation will be lost on those whose own ideas of right and wrong are 
established in this way. Although this is not the time or place to pursue the 
interpretation of Longus’s novel any further, suffice it to say that the present author, 
at least, is convinced that Longus means for us to see what is happening here, and 
elsewhere, and hold these people to higher ethical standards than those to which 
they apparently hold themselves.  
5. Conclusion 
 
To this day, the lives of individuals, of communities, and of nations provide no lack of 
examples of “naïve justice,” including the various permutations just described (viz. 
primitive justice or tribal justice). The problems of ethical philosophy would be very 
easy to solve with these kinds of axioms, uncritically applied, as they are by 
Socrates’ interlocutors in Book I of Plato’s Republic (Howland, 1993). The challenge 
posed to Socrates by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book II – to prove 
that δικαιοσύνη is not a contingent good but an absolute one, bonum in se – leads 
not only to the creation of the ideal city, but to metaphysical explorations that still 
resonate.  
It would be difficult, if not ultimately impossible, to prove that all three of 
the authors discussed here, in the passages cited, are consciously contributing to 
the same discussion as Plato and Aristotle. The most important point to be made 
here, however, is not one of later authors borrowing from or alluding to the work of 
earlier authors, as interesting as this kind of study sometimes proves to be. The 
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problem of δικαιοσύνη is central to ethical discourse in Greek, and something very 
much like it, if variously worded, continues to be central. Children expect and even 
demand naïve justice in their stories: the good are to be rewarded, and the bad to be 
punished. Adults know, from experience, that life rather seldom presents us with 
such simple outcomes, in large part because determining what is right and what is 
wrong, in real situations, is seldom so clear cut. This, in turn, makes it very hard 
indeed to separate the good from the wicked, pace the legions of demagogues of 
right and left. As much as we may long for the clarity of naïve justice, it is only to be 
had at a price, which is closing our eyes to the complexity of the world we live in. 
The task of ethical philosophy is to confront that complexity, establish the axioms, 
identify the rules by which they can be applied to complicated situations, and 
provide us with something far more satisfactory, even if far more difficult, than 
naïve justice. 
My contention here has been that these three trial scenes, for all the 
silliness that often surrounds them, send this message precisely. Despite the 
association with popular literature and the absence of academic credentials, we 
could do worse than to listen.  
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Abstract: This article discusses three trial scenes from three different ancient Greek 
novels (by Chariton, Achilles Tatius, and Longus), in which naïve justice seems to be 
deliberately subverted. The titular concept of “naïve justice” is defined here in terms 
borrowed from Aristotle’s Poetics, where the term “double resolution” is used, 
disparagingly, of plots in which the good characters are all rewarded and the bad 
characters all punished. The argument is made that the trial scenes under 
discussion should raise doubts in the reader’s mind as to which of the parties is truly 
guilty, and which is truly innocent. This can be seen as a reflection of unexpectedly 
mature ethical sensibilities on the part of these often-underestimated writers, who 
seem to have grasped that the “double resolution” may make the reader feel good, 
but has little to do with the real world. 
Keywords:  justice, moral ambiguity, ancient Greek novel, fictional jurisprudence, 
popular fiction 
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